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1Preface
This report is designed to complement two others, the User
Documentation and the Model Verficiation (MIT-EL-80-026 and
MIT-EL-81-004, respectively). The Model Verification was written to
document the theoretical bases for PVI, an interactive computer model to
support commercialization policy for photovoltaics. It was also written
to verify that the computer code, which is the essence of PV1, accurately
performs the function that it was meant to perform.
As in many analytic procedures, there are two phases to the use of
PV1: use of the model itself, and subsequent interpretation of the
resutls. The first phase, the use of PV1, is covered in detail in the
User Documentation. The User Documentation will evolve as PV1 evolves,
as new features are added and improved data is incorporated.
The purpose of this report is to demonstrate the proper
interpretation of results from PV1, to avoid abuse of these results, and
to provide an example of an extended analysis. In addition, the
conclusions drawn may be considered a guide for the establishment of
preliminary PV commercialization policy.
2Abstract
The purpose of this report is the demonstrate the use of PVI as a
policy analysis device. This analysis consists of the creation of a base
case and the subsequent running of 50 additional cases to demonstrate the
effects of changes in spending levels.
Acording to PV1, government policy to accelerate the
commercialization of PV takes the form of spending in five areas:
advertising, market development, subsidy, technology development and
advanced research and development. Each of these spending areas, or
policy options, has a unique effect on the acceptability of PV in the
potential market, and on the price of PV. The effects of a particular
policy are measured by using four policy criteria: the total number of
KWp of PV installed after 8 years; the rate at which the market is being
penetrated during those 8 years; the percent of total KWp installed after
8 years that orginates from the private sector; and the overall
efficiency of the policy, as measured by the total cost of the policy
divided by the total KWp installed.
The purpose of the 50 cases was to illustrate the senstivity of the
policy criteria to changes in the spending levels of the five policy
options. Each of these cases is examined separately, and then the
results were used to contrast multiple regression equations. The
equations, one for each policy criterion as a dependent variable, have 50
cases and use the policy option spending levels as independent
variables. These equations act as linear versions of PV1, and as such
can help the policy maker to estimate the effects of various spending
levels on the policy criteria for policies that are similar to the base
case.
3The most important conclusions involved subsidy and market
development. It was found that both of these spending options would be
most effective if they started at low levels and gradually increased over
time. Compared to the base case, it was found that market development
spending could be reduced and subsidy spending increased, thereby
improving all of the policy criteria. In general, market development and
subsidy spending should be coordinated.
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PV1: AN INTERACTIVE COMPUTER MODEL TO SUPPORT
COMMERCIALIZATION POLICY FOR PHOTOVOLTAICS
Policy Analysis
I. Introduction
I.1 Purpose
The purpose of this technical report is to demonstrate the use of
PV1, an interactive computer model developed at the MIT Energy
Laboratory. PV1 is designed to assist the photovoltaic policy maker in
evaluating alternative policies for the accelerated commercialization of
photovoltaics. To do this, PV1 has many variables that represent
spending options to the policy maker, and many other variables that
represent the commercialization levels that the spending is simulated to
achieve. Because of the large number of these variables, a method has
been chosen to summarize the relationships between the spending, or
policy options (exogenously defined), and those variables that reflect
commercialization levels (endogenous variables), or policy criteria.
The method used in this summary was to first select a base case
involving a "most likely" set of spending levels for each policy option.
The values of each of these spending levels was then changed, one at a
time, in separate PVI runs, to measure the effects on the policy
options. This resulted in a total of 50 PV1 runs. The values of the 50
policy options (spending levels) and policy criteria (commercialization
levels) were then used to create a data base, each case representing a
different "reality", or scenario, with specific spending levels and
degrees of PV commercialization, as simulated by PV1. Usng the policy
6criteria as dependent variables and the policy options as independent
variables, this data base was then used to construct multiple linear
regression equations, which could in turn be used to estimate an optimal
policy for Commercialization.
It is acknowledged that the various policy options, such as market
development and subsidy, may originate from different government
agencies. This report is directed torward each of these separate
agencies and to their consultants. If only one lesion is to be learned
from this report it is that the policy options (and therefore efforts by
the appropriate agencies) must be carefully coordinated for the
construction of an effective and efficient overall policy for the
accelerated commercialization of PV. We assume that the reader has a
basic understanding of the technologies of photovoltaics (PV), and the
PV1 model. Readers who are interested in the literature concerning the
motivation for PV are referred to the Appendix of the PVI User
Documentation. The User Documentation (MIT Energy Laboratory Report
MIT-EL-80-026) also describes the PV1 model in sufficient detail to allow
the reader to use it directly if desired. The model is thoroughly
documented in another recent report, MIT-EL-81-004, Model Verification.
1.2 Background
PV1 is a discrete-time, deterministic computer model , available to
the user in an interactive mode via the MULTICS system at MIT. The model
is designed to assess government actions, such as price subidies and
market development, which are meant to make PV more acceptable in the
market by making more potential users aware of PV, by reducing the price
of PV, and by instilling confidence in the viability of PV as a
7technically and economically viable alternative energy technology. Other
government actions, such as spending for technology development (TD) and
for advanced research and development (AR+D), are expected to enhance the
basic and production technologies for PV, thereby accelerating the rate
at which the price of PV comes down over time.
The policy analysis performed here takes the form of sensitivity
analyses. A base case is defined in terms of its spending levels, and
these levels are then changed to illustrate the relative effectiveness of
each policy option on the policy criteria. The policy options include
subsidy, market development, advertising, technology development, and
advanced research and development.
SUBSIDY (SUB): Subsidy is defined in PV1 as the percent of the
purchase price that is paid by the government, with an upper limit or
ceiling, to the PV purchaser. Subsidy, and all other policy options, may
vary in the amount allocated or spent. In addition, the subsidy may vary
over time, and from one sector to another. It is assumed that subsidies
will be constant throughout all regions of the country.
MARKET DEVELOPMENT (MD): Market development is defined as money
spent to construct government-owned PV installations, in any sector,
time, and region of the country. Market development, or MD, serves to
lower the price of PV to all users by increasing the production rate, and
also increases the number of successful installations seen by potential
buyers. This will help to convince potential buyers of the technical and
economic viability of PV. Since MD may be allocated over regions, the
shape of the MD policy can take on a very large number of forms. For
example, these units may be constructed in many widely dispersed areas,
or they may be concentrated in just a few regions.
8ADVERTISING (ADV): Government expenditures on advertising help to
increase the awareness of PV among potential users. It is assumed that a
government advertising campaign will be associated with the market
development program, so the spending for advertising is defined as an
additional fraction of market development spending.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (TD) AND ADVANCED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(AR+D): Spending for technology development and for advanced research
and development help to accelerate the arrival of new production and
basic PV technologies.
These new technologies are expected to effect the manner in which the
PV module price declines over time. It is projected in PV1 that this
price reduction will occur in three distinct stages: during the first
stage, the PV module price is a function of both the price of silicon
(the element most likely to be used for PV in the near future) and the
level of annual PV production; during the second stage, the module price
is dependent only on the price of silicon, since it is assumed that the
optimal production level will have been attained for each manufacturing
facility (i.e., the module price will no longer depend on the annual
production level); and during the third stage, an ultimate low price for
the module will have been achieved.
The spending levels for TD and AR+D will, in PV1, accelerate the
arrivals of stages 2 and 3, respectively. The PVl user has a great deal
of control over the manner in which these spending levels bring about the
heat price reduction stage. For further details, consult the User
Documentation, Section II.C "Cost Reduction."
1.3 Policy Criteria
For the purpose of this analysis, four evaluation criteria have been
selected:
1) the total cumulative market penetration of PV by the last year
of the planning horizon;
2) the rate at which the market is penetrated;
3) the efficiency of the policy in stimulating sales (that is, the
total governmental spending per cumulative KWp or PV
installed);
4) the extent of private involvement in the market by the last year
of the model.
The market penetration rate is defined as 'B' in the least squares
regression equation:
x(t)Px(t) = A + Bt
where x(t) is the cumulative sales at time t, and L(t) is the total
market at time t. Thus if B doubles from one policy to another, the
second policy results in a market penetration that is twice as fast as
the first.
X(t)
A linear relationship between -t- and B is justified here due to the
nearly linear shape of the market penetration "S" curve in early years of
the adoption of a new product; this is the period simulated by PV1.
Also, care has been taken to avoid zero sales levels in early years
(although very low values have been achieved in some runs), thereby
averting exponential sales growth during the model's eight-year horizon.
For the best evaluation, a model should include as long a planning
horizon as possible. However, long range planning models may be
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impractical from a computational point of view. Therefore the first two
criteria, total cumulative market penetration and speed of penetration
are used to indicate what has occurred by the last year of the model and
what the trend is for future years, respectively.
There are two fundamental assumptions that go into constructing these
criteria. First, the real goal of the government PV program is to
maximize the total PV installed, in the private sector of the economy.
The second assumption is that the government is indifferent to where, in
terms of both sector (residential, commercial, etc.) and region, PV is
installed, and that policies will be constructed to maximize this total
for a given budget.
The use of the 4th policy criterion, the percent of private
involvement, may be deceiving at low total sales levels. The 3rd policy
criterion, policy efficiency, may also be deceiving at low market
penetration and low budget levels. Also, the total cumulative market
penetration, the 1st criterion, may be high but not increasing. Thus all
4 policy criteria must be used together.
A series of PV1 runs were used to examine the effectiveness of each
of the policy options individually, both with respect to amounts and to
policy "shapes." A policy "shape: refers to the increase or decrease of
spending over time, and the distribution of spending over regions and
sectors. Following this, an analysis of all policy options together were
conducted to compare options as well as to provide a summary and
guidelines for determining an "optimal" policy. It should be noted that
this optimal policy is a function of the structure of the base case, that
several optima may be found, and that the choice of an optimum may be
ambiguous due to the use of more than one criterion.
Ideally, an optimal policy would be found through the use of four
dynamic optimizations, one for each criterion. In an eight year, seven
sector model with 469 utility districts, this would involve the
evaluation of about 5 x 106 variables, an unworkably large number for
dynamic optimization. Thus, a dynamic optimization will not be used, and
instead the model will be run with a base case and approximately 50
additional cases to test the sensitivity of the criteria to the policy
options. The end result will be a series of least-squares multiple
regression equations that will summarize the workings of the PV1 model
under the base case conditions.
We use several linear multiple regression equations because we are
only interested in first-order effects of policy options in the vicinity
of the base case. In addition, these equations are not in themselves
designed to be policy analysis tools, but rather to be used as initial
approximations for the policy maker who is considering a policy similar
to the base case. If the policy under consideration by the policy maker
is very different from the base case, the policy maker is advised to
perform an analysis similar to this one to provide initial guidance in
policy formulation.
1.4 Base Case Model
The base case used in this analysis is loosely defined by the basic
funding level used in the Photovoltaic Energy Systems Program Element
Report from the US Department of Energy, revised March 5, 1980. This
basic budget level includes allocations for advanced research and
development (AR+D), technology development (TD), market development (MD),
systems, engineering standards, and tests and applications. Some of
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these categories have been redefined in this analysis to more closely
conform with the definitions of the budget allocations as defined in
PVI. Price subsidies for the base case are 40% of the purchase price for
residences, with a limit of $4000 per installation on the amount of the
subsidy, and 15% of the purchase price for all other sectors, with
essentially no upper limit to the subsidy. These subsidies continue for
the entire 8 years for which the base case model runs.
The basecase model allocates a total of $310.1 million over the eight
years for AR+D, and $479.2 million for TD. Allocations are summarized in
Table I.1.
Table I.1: Allocations for Base Case Model
($ Millions)
Model Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Advertising 6.5 14.5 15.0 15.0 15.0 16.0 20.0 20.0
Market Dev. 38.7 34.5 50.6 51.0 58.0 65.0 66.0 76.0
Subsidy
Residential: 40% of purchase price with $4000 ceiling per installation
Non-residential: 15% of purchase price, no ceiling
AR+D $310.1 total
TD: $479.2 total
The base case model includes seven sectors: new residential,
retrofit residential , commercial (including office buildings, retail
stores, banks, etc.), industrial, agricultural, central power, and public
authority (including schools and offices). For the base case, all market
development is assigned to the retrofit residential market, as is
advertising.
PV installations in one sector have less than a one-for-one effect on
the potential purchasers in another sector. The sectoral influence
matrix is given in Table 1.2. Note that the matrix is symmetrical about
the diagonal, indicating that the influence of sector A on sector B is
equal to the influence of sector B on sector A.
Table 1.2: Sectoral Influence Matrix
Influenced
Sector
1
1 .00
0.90
0.20
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
2
0.90
1.00
0.20
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
Infl
3
0.20
0.20
1.00
0.70
0.80
0.30
0.10
uencing
4
0.10
0.10
0.70
1.00
0.50
0.60
0.20
Sector
5
0.30
0.30
0.80
0.50
1.00
0.10
0.20
6
0.10
0.10
0.30
0.60
0.10
1.00
0.20
7
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.20
0.20
1.00
Sector Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Sector
New Residential
Retrofit Residential
Commercial
Industrial
Agricul tural
Central Power
Public Authority
- - - --
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Installations within a sector but in other regions will have a
reduced influence as an inverse function of the square of the distance
between the regions. For the base case model, the distance over which
the influence will drop to 0.5 (the "Half-Influence" Distance) is 100
miles. This and other parameters are summarized in Table 1.3 below.
Table 1.3: Exogenous Parameters in Base Case Model
Half-Influence Distance:
PV maintenance costs:
Mark-up and distribution costs:
PV system useful life expectancy:
Warranty period:
Loan parameters:
PV system conversion efficiency:
Annual real increase in the cost of
electricity:
Cost of silicon:
Ultimate module price:
Buy-back rate:
TOTAL Private TD expenditures:
100 miles
10% of annualized cost of capital
20% of total system cost
20 years
12 months
10 years at 20%
12%
3%
$84/Kg
$0.70/Wp
60% of selling price
$2 million
A note is appropriate here on the use of the word "model ." PV1 is a
computer "model" that is written in the PL/I computer language. Using
PV1, an individual creates a "submodel" that contains the values of the
policy options and exogenous parameters. In the remainder of this text,
we will use the word "model" to mean "submodel," for the sake of
simplicity.
This completes the description of the parameters used in the base
case model. The analyses that follow will examine the sensitivity of the
policy criteria to allocations for AR+D, TD, MD, ADV, and SUB.
Individual runs will be executed to test various policy "shapes" and
spending levels. A series of PV characteristics will be tested,
including expected useful system life, warranty period, and system
conversion efficiency. The effects of the rise of electricity costs will
also be examined. These individual tests will be covered in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 will aggregate the tests from the preceding chapter, and will
summarize PV1 under base case conditions by presenting a series of
multiple regression equations. Results, conclusions, and suggestions for
further work are given in Chapter 4.
Summary
As a first step in developing an "optimal" policy, a base case was
defined in terms of most likely spending levels for each of the policy
options. Each of these spending levels was then changed, one at a time,
to measure the sensitivity of the policy criteria to individual changes
in spending. This generated a data base with 50 cases, each representing
a different spending and commercialization scenario. These data were
then used to construct linear multiple regression equations, which were
in turn used to estimate an optimal policy. The details of these cases
are dicussed in Chapter 2, and the regression eequations in Chapter 3.
II. Analysis of Policy Components
The total government policy toward the accelerated commercialization
of PV includes spending for subsidy, market development, advertising,
technology development, and advanced research and development. Each of
these policy components includes characteristics regarding the allocation
of spending over regions of the country, across sectors of the economy,
timing of expenditures, and the total allocation. In this chapter, each
of the components will be analyzed separately to determine the
effectiveness of allocation, timing, etc., on the four policy evaluation
criteria outlined in the Introduction, and on the ability of the policy
to reduce the price of PV at the end of eight years.
II.1 Subsidy
The subsidization of PV is defined in PV1 as the reduction of the
price of the PV installation to the owner by the direct reduction of
income tax liability. More specifically, it is defined as the fraction
of the purchase price paid by the government with an upper limit, or
ceiling, that each owner may receive through this tax reduction. Further
aspects of tax laws and regulations, such as "carry forward" or effects
on capital gains, are not included in PVI. Also, the subsidy policy
varies only over time and among sectors, not among states; state-wide
subsidies are not included in the model. It is also an assumption of PVl
that policies will not vary between urban and rural areas, or among
income levels or housing types in the residential sector. These
variations will be addressed in later versions of PV1.
The subsidy instituted by the government has four attributes: the
actual amount (or fraction of the purchase price), the ceiling on the
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amount. For each installation, the timing of the subsidy over the
horizon of the model, and the allocation across sectors. The basecase
model uses the current DOE subsidy levels of 40% for new and retrofit
residential installations with a $4000 limit per installation, and 15%
with no upper limit for all other sectors. These subsidies remain
constant through all eight years of the base case model . This results in
a total spending level of $31.0 million for subsidy over the eight years
and 158.0 x 103 Kwp total installed PV of which 23.1% is privately owned
(that is, not the result of government market development). This base
case policy has an effectiveness of 8.77 x 103$/Kw p. The value of B, the
market penetration rate, for the base case is .297 (omitting the factor
-4
of 10-4 for the sake of clarity).
One of the issues concerning subsidies is the existence of ceilings.
By simply eliminating the ceilings on the residential sectors' subsidies,
the total government spending or subsidy does not change substantially
from the base case levels (see Case SUB-I, Table II.1.A); it increases
from $31.01 million to $31.03 million. Similarly, the elimination of
these ceilings does not alter the penetration rate, B; the total
Kw of PV installed after eight years; the fraction of the PV installed
after eight years; the fraction of the installed Kwp that is private;
nor the spending per Kwp installed. In addition, the gross system price
remains unchanged at $2.83 per Wp, and the average subsidized (or net)
system price at $1.82. Therefore, the presence of a subsidy ceiling is
relatively unimportant, given the basecase subsidy levels.
To test the effects of reduced subsidy spending, a model was run with
a subsidy of 40% with a $4000 ceiling, for the new residential sector
only. This did result in reduced subsidy spending (to $0.72 million),
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and decreased spending per Kwp, since the total Kwp installed remained
virtually unchanged. But all of the other criteria also remained the
same as the base case.
To evaluate market penetration effects of higher subsidy rates, it is
desirable to remove one source of confusion--the subsidy ceiling. As
long as ceilings are in effect, an increase in the subsidized fraction of
the purchase price may generate results that are ambiguous because the
ceiling may reduce the effective subsidy rate. For this reason, (and
because it is not the purpose of this paper to determine thresholds) the
remaining subsidy analysis will not include any ceilings.
Increasing the fraction of the purchase price that is subsidized from
40% for the residential sectors to 80%, and other sectors from 15% to
50%, with no ceilings as in case SUB-2 (see Table II.1), a substantial
impact on the policy criteria results. While the amount spent on
subsidies increases to $142.5 million over the eight years, the total
Kwp of PV installed also increases by almost 21% compared to a total
spending increase of only 8%. The total Kwp of PV increases to 191 x 103
the fraction of total Kwp installed that is private increases to 35%, and
the value of the parameter 'B' increases to .357. Also, the gross system
cost is reduced to $2.69, and the net system cost is reduced to $0.65.
Increased subsidy spending is therefore an effective means for enhancing
the policy criteria. A question remains as to the timing of the subsidy
over the period of the model.
SUBSIDY TIMING: In order to simplify the analysis of the timing of
subsidy, the fraction of the purchase price covered by the subsidy is
increased in all sectors to 80%. If this level is maintained for all
eight years, the results are similar to the previous case (see Case
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SUB-3): subsidy spending is increased to $161.7 million, total Kwp of PV
installed is 190.8 x 103 with 34.7% of the installations originating from
the private sector, 'B' is .357, and the 8th year prices are $2.70 gross
and $0.54 net. If 80% is considered the maximum subsidy, could subsidy
spending be reduced in earlier or later years with an acceptably small
sacrifice in the policy criteria?
A case was run (SUB-4) in which the maximum of 80% subsidy was
maintained for the first 4 years of the model. It was then reduced to
60% in the fifth year, 30 percent in the sixth year, and zero for the
last two years. This reduced the subsidy spending to $62 million, but at
the same time reduced all of the criteria to basecase levels. Therefore,
the additional $31 million spent over the basecase is not justified if it
is allocated in this manner. This is because the early subsidy spending
is being used to purchase fewer, more expensive units than later subsidy
spending. Could this mean that the optimal subsidy policy is one which
waits for the price to come down?
A model was run (SUB-5) that was the mirror image of the previous
run: the subsidy was zero for the first two years, 30% the second year,
60% the third, and 80% for the last 4 years of the model. This resulted
in subsidy spending of $136.4 million, and policy criteria that are
similar to the case (SUB-3) in which the subsidy was maintained at 80
percent for all eight years: total Kwp installed, 190.8 x 103; percent
private, 34.7; 'B', .357. The gross and net system prices were also the
same. The total spending per Kwp installed was 7.95 x 103 for the case
of 80% for all years, 8.97 x 103 for the case in which the subsidy
declined to zero after seven years, and 7.81 x 103 for the case that
increased from zero after two years. Thus if subsidy spending is to be
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increased over the base case level, it is best to wait a few years before
beginning this subsidy.
Another timing alternative is to wait until the price of PV is
substantially reduced before initiating subsidy spending, and then
gradually reducing this spending over time. A model was run (SUB-6) in
which the subsidy was begun in the fourth year of the model at a full 80%
(with no ceiling), then dropped to 60%, 40%, and then 30%. A similar
model (SUB-7), beginning subsidies after only 3 years, showed similar
results. These proved to be about as efficient as the base case, with
only slight improvements in the other policy criteria, and in terms of
all of the criteria, not as desirable as the subsidy policy that is
delayed for a few years and builds slowly over time.
Table II.1.A: Summary of Subsidy Runs
Subsidy
Spending
($mill ions)
31.03
142.50
161.71
61.97
136.35
39,34
53.04
Total
Kwp
Installed
157,967
190,658*
190,839*
157,971
190,836*
160,354
160,355
Percent
Private
Install-
B ations
.297 23.1
.357* 34.6
.357* 34.7*
.297 23.1
.357* 34.7*
.303 24.1
.303 24.1
*Most desirable in terms of this criterion
Case
No.
SUB-1
SUB-2
SUB-3
SUB-4
SUB-5
SUB-6
SUB-7
Total
Spending
per Kwp
Installed
8774
7854
7948
8970
7815*
8695
8781
Net
System
Cost
($/wp)
1.82
0.65
0.54*
2.83
0.54*
1.99
1.99
Gross
System
Cost
($/wp)
2.83
2.69*
2.70
2.83
2.70
2.84
2.84
Table II.l.B: Subsidy Correlations*
Correlation coefficients of subsidy spending with:
Variable Correlation
Total Kwp installed 0.5495
Percent Private Installations -.1765
Spending per Kwp installed -.3007
B .5172
Gross System Cost -.3851
*Includes cases discussed but not shown in Table II.1.A.
As shown in Table II.1.B, subsidy spending itself has a positive
influence on the policy criteria, except for the percent of the
installations that are private. (This negative correlation is the result
of cases with wasteful early subsidy spending.) Subsidy spending also
tends to reduce the gross system cost after 8 years.
There are two further conclusions that may be drawn from these
analyses regarding subsidies. First, increased subsidies are effective
in improving some policy criteria, but if the fraction of the purchase
price covered by the subsidy is substantially larger than 40%, ceilings
on subsidies will have to be increased or eliminated to make the
increased subsidy effective. Second, it could be advantageous to delay
the subsidy, or at least maintain it at a low level, until PV prices are
reduced through increased production, and then to increase the subsidy
steadily over time.
11.2 Market Development (MD)
Allocations for MD provide government "buys" that are used to
demonstrate the technical viability of PV. The amount spent on MD is
22
defined here in terms of dollars, as opposed to purchased Kw . In
addition to defining the total amount allocated to MD, this policy
component has parameters relating to its allocation to the various
sectors, over time, and to the various regions, or utility districts.
Testing all possible combinations would require an enormous number of
simulations, so a few cases have been selected to illustrate the effects
of these parameters.
In the base case model , all MD is allocated to the residential
retrofit sector. In all , eleven cases were run to illustrate the effects
of MD spending on the policy criteria. These are summarized in Table
II.2.A.
Table II.2.A: Market Development Cases
Total Spending/ Percent
Case MD Spending Total Kw KwD  B Private
MD-T 360.0 12T2 110 7 .- 27 33.3
MD-2 480.0 148074 9710 .275 24.1
MD-3 480.0 159917 9000 .298 22.6
MD-4 439.8 157800 8782 .297 23.0
MD-5 439.8 156417 8852 .294 22.4
MD-6 439.8 157471 8799 .296 22.9
MD-7 440.0 96138 14477 .151 24.9
MD-8 442.0 177547 7756 .348 12.0
MD-9 240.0 89906 12564 .165 28.3
MD-10 720.0 231378* 7561* .433* 16.5
MD-11 37.3 39264 25170 .063 93.1*
*Most desirable according to this criterion
According to Table II.2.A, there is an ambiguous ranking of the
policies tested. Case MD10O appears to be highly desirable in terms of
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total market penetration, policy efficiency, and rate of market
penetration. Unfortunately, only 16.5% of the cumulative market
penetration after eight years is from the private sector of the economy.
The qualitative aspects of these policies require extensive
explanation. In Case MD-1 subsidy is set at 80% of the purchase price
with no effective ceiling, for all sectors. The market development
spending for this case is 0.0 for the public authority, central power,
and residential sectors. Annual MD spending is $15 million each in the
commercial, industrial, and agricultural sectors, for a total of $360
million MD spending for the eight year model. Case MD-2 increases this
total to $480 million, or $20 million annually per sector for these same
sectors, while decreasing the subsidy to the base case level. From the
previous section, it was noted that an increase of the subsidy from the
basecase level to 80% without a ceiling, for all sectors and years,
resulted in substantial increases in the total market penetration,
percent private installations, and the speed of market penetration.
Reducing MD spending to below the base case level (case MD-1) more than
offset the increase, due to increased subsidy, in all criteria except the
percent of private installations. Even if total MD spending is increased
to an amount above the basecase level, the redistribuition of MD funds
out of the residential retrofit sector into the commercial, industrial,
and agricultural sectors, as in case MD-2, does not substantially affect
the policy criteria. This is also true if the same amount of increased
MD spending is completely allocated to the industrial sector, as in case
MD-3.
Three regional allocations schemes were tested for mearket
development:
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1. 20% to California, 10% to Nevada, 10% to Arizona, 10% to New
Mexico, 10% to Hawaii, 40% evenly distributed throughout the
country (MD-4). The purpose of this scheme was to test the
effectiveness of allocating MD to those areas of greatest solar
radiation.
2. All MD funds were allocated to California (MD-5); and
3. 75% of MD was allocated to the 15 utility districts with the
highest values of solar radiation times the price of electricity
(MD-6). This would allow early PV users to take advantage of
both high solar radiation levels and attractive PV economics.
That is, the value per square meter of PV was highest in these
areas. The remaining 75% was allocated to the rest of the
country.
None of these three reallocations (MD-4, MD-5, and MD-6) substantially
improved the policy criteria over the basecase. The optimal MD
allocation scheme across regions of the country and across sectors would
therefore be the one that is simplest to administer, on the bases of
criteria that are not included in this analysis.
The timing of MD spending is the essential difference between cases
MD-7 and 8. Case MD-7 provides $110 million per year for the first four
years of the model, in the residential retrofit sector only. This
results in substantially reduced market penetration as well as
penetration rate ('B'), while the total MD spending level is close to the
base case. Early MD spending is apparently disadvantageous. By spending
approximately the same MD but in later years, as in case MD-8,
considerably higher market penetration is achieved, at a faster rate, and
at twice the efficiency of case MD-7, but at the expense of a lower
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percentage private involvement in the market (although the total Kwp of
private PV installations is 12% higher in MD-7 than MD-8). This may be
an acceptable trade-off if the allocation of MD spending is discontinued
shortly after the last year of the model horizon.
The last three cases MD-9, 10, and 11 , represent differences in
spending levels in the residential retrofit market only. These levels
are $240 million, $720 million, and $37.3 million totals, respectively.
In addition, case MD-11, with its low MD expenditure, also has an
increase in the amount of spending in technology development (TD)
sufficient enough to accelerate the arrival of stage 2 production
technology by one year. The results of these three cases illustrate the
fact that increased MD spending results in an increase in all of the
policy criteria except the percent of the total installations that are
private.
Table II.2.B: Correlations for MD Spending*
Correlation coefficients of MD spending with:
Variable Correlation
Percent Private Installations -.7118
Total Installations .8009
B .7240
Gross System Cost -.0847
Spending per Kwp installed -.8264
*Includes case TD-1 (MD-ll) and TD-2 (not included in Table II.2.A).
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This conclusion is supported by the figures in Table II.2.B, for all
eleven MD cases. MD spending tends to improve all policy criteria,
except the percent of the installations that are private, and decreases
the 8th year gross system cost.
11.3 Advertising
The amount spent on advertising is defined in PV1 as a fraction of
the amount spent on MD for a given year. This amount directly affects
the awareness of PV among the potential buyers. The amount spent on
advertising (ADV) is therefore a function of the allocations to MD, over
time and sectors. To simplify this analysis, the basecase MD allocation
was used in cases ADV-1 through ADV-5. This means that all ADV is being
allocated to the residential retrofit sector.
Market development installations also have have an advertising value
since MD spending increases awareness of PV. It is assumed in PV1 that
60 percent of the expenditures for MD will have a similar
dollar-for-dollar effect on the awareness of PV among the potential
market as advertising. Thus the total effective advertising expenditures
for each year of the model are defined as:
effective ADV = (A .60) MD
where A = fraction of MD spending that is directly allocated to ADV,
in addition to original MD spending.
In all, five cases were run to test the sensitivity of the policy
criteria to changes in the level of advertising spending. The
advertising fraction of the MD spending level was varied between 0.00 and
1.00. In addition, cases illustrating gradually increasing and gradually
decreasing levels, over time, were tested. In the worst case (ADV-1,
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Table II.3.A), when ADV was reduced to 0.00 percent, the total market
penetration after eight years was only 0.82 percent less than the
basecase. In the best case, when the ADV was increased to 100 percent of
the MD spending, the total market penetration was only 1.11 percent
higher than the basecase. Similar effects were seen on the other
criteria except spending per Kwp. This is to a large extent the result
of the large awareness effects of MD spending. Any conclusions that are
drawn from the effects of advertising on the policy criteria are very
much a result of the assumptions made in the construction of PVI.
Table II.3.A: Summary of Advertising Cases
Total
Advertising Total Percent Spending
Case Spending Kwp 4 Private per Kwp
No. ($millions) Installed B x 10 Installation Installed
ADV-1 0 157,679 .297 22.5 8036
ADV-2(l) 175.9 158,326 .298 23.3 9040
ADV-3(2) 439.8 159,721 .300 23.9 8685
ADV-4(3) 288.0 159,087 .299 23.6 9736
ADV-5(4) 315.1 158,625 .299 23.4 9932
(1) Advertising is 40% of MD spending for all years.
(2) Advertising spending equals MD spending for all years.
(3) Advertising percent of MD by year: 100, 100, 100, 90, 80, 70, 40, 0.
(4) Advertising percent of MD by year: 0, 0, 40, 70, 90, 100, 100, 100.
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Table II.3.B: Correlations for ADV Spending
Correlation coefficients of ADV spending with:
Variable Correlation
Percent Private Installations .9785
Total Installations .9676
B .9810
Gross System Cost .0000
Spending per Kwp installed .5255
In reference to Table II.3.B, it appears that advertising 1) is
effective in accelerating market penetration and private involvement in
the market, 2) has no effect on the eighth year gross system cost, and 3)
is inefficient in that it tends to increase the spending per installed
Kwp. These correlations must be viewed in the context of the relatively
minute variance in the policy criteria resulting from large changes in
ADV spending. The correlations only imply that increases in ADV spending
will most likely be accompanied by increases in market penetration and
private involvement, but not the extent to which this will occur.
Spending for advertising, as defined in PV1, does not seem very important
in its effect on the policy criteria.
11.4 Technology Development (TD), and Advanced Research and Development
(AR+D)
These two policy options are treated together here because the
algorithms for computing the effects of both TD and AR+D spending are
similar. As shown in the PV1 User Documentation, the effects of these
spending options are to accelerate the arrivals of new stages of
production technologies. During the first production technology stage of
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PV1, the price of the PV module is a function of both the level of
production and the price of silicon. It is assumed that by the time the
second stage arrives, the most efficient production plant sizes will have
been established and constructed, so the module price is only a function
of the cost of silicon. The arrival of this second stage is accelerated
by increasing the amount spent on TD. In the third production technology
stage, the module price is assumed to have reached an ultimate low price,
as defined by the PV1 user. For these analyses, the value is set at
$0.70 per Kw p
The algorithm used to compute the years of arrival of the two stages,
from year zero, is defined as:
XB
T = (t2 - t0)[1 X] + toS+X
t2 - t3  tI - t
where B =Log2  _ •
= t3 t t 2 - t
ti-to
1 = t 2 - ti
and T = date of arrival of next stage
X = total TD spending (for stage 2 arrival) or AR+D
spending (for stage 3 arrival)
D = most likely total government spending level ($ million)
t = earliest possible date for arrival of next stage if
unlimited funds are spent
tl most likely date of arrival of next stage at the most
likely spending level, D1
t 2 = date of arrival of next stage if no spending isallocated
t 3 = the most likely date for the arrival of the next stage
if the spending level is X=2D 1 .
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The values for t o through t 3 and for D1 are based loosely on the
Photovoltaic Energy Systems Program Element Report, revised March 5,
1980, from the Department of Energy. The values of to through t3 that
are used in this analysis given in Table II.4.A, and sample curves for
estimating the arrival dates derived from these 't' values are shown in
Figure II.1.
Time to
Stage
Change,
T
DI  2D1
Case(A)
2D0
X
Case(B)
X = TD or AR and D
Figure II- 4 Illustration of the Effects of Values
of TO, Ti , T2 , and T3 on the Computation of
Staging Times, T
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Table II.4.A: Values of t 0 , t l , t 2 , and t 3 for Estimating
the Arrivals of Stages 2 and 3.
to ti t 2  t 3
TD (Stages 1 to 2) 1 5 13 2
AR+D (Stages 2 to 3) 3 9 20 5
The use of this rather complex algorithm for estimating the arrival
of new production technology stages illustrates the difficulty in
determining the effects of TD and AR+D spending on cost reduction. Since
the results of these analyses may depend to a large extent on the choices
for the parameters in these algorithms, this section will include
discussions of the effects of both spending and dates of stage changes.
The PVl algorithm cuts off any spending for TD after the arrival of
stage 2, and similarly cuts off spending for AR+D once stage 3 has
arrived. This is in contrast to the DOE program element report, which
continues spending in these areas even after PV has achieved technology
and commercial readiness stages. Since it is the purpose of these
analyses to test the effects of spending levels for AR+D and TD, the
entire allocations in these policy options were spent in year one of the
model. Timing effects of these policy options are difficult to assess
because their effects on price reductions are difficult to model in
general, as stated above. Spending the entire amounts in year one will
not affect the arrival of stages 2 and 3, and assures that all
allocations for AR+D and TD are indeed spent in the model.
Six cases were run to test the sensitivity of the policy criteria to
TD spending, and five were run to test for AR+D. These runs are
summarized in Table II.4.B.
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Table II.4.B: Models Run for TD and AR+D
Case TD Spent Spent
TD-1
TD-2
TD-3
TD-4
TD-5
TD-6
ARD -1
ARD-2
ARD-3
ARD-4
ARD-5
606.0
604.0
354.0
404.0
454.0
1000.0
475.0
600.0
800.0
800.0
800.0
AR+D Stage Stage
2 3
310.1
310.1
310.1
310.1
310.1
310.1
410.0
510.0
610.0
610.0
710.0
Spend
per Kw
B ($000's)
.063
.322
.237
.268
.268
.343
.319
.445
.446*
.233
.255
25.2
9.0
9.4
8.9
9.3
10.4
8.3
7.1*
8.2
14.0
13.9
Total Kw
Perc Instal .
Priv. ($000's)
93.1"
21.8
27.0
24.8
24.8
20.1
20.6
15.4
15.0
27.8
26.9
39.3
167.8
134.7
147.2
147.2
182.2
177.5
238.2
244.7*
124.7
132.8
*Indicates most desirable in terms of this criterion.
Although cases ARD-1 through ARD_5 are used to evaluate the effects in
changes in AR+D spending, TD spending was also increased in these cases
to ensure that the arrival of stage 3 was later than the arrival of stage
2.
Cases TD-1, ARD-4, and ARD-5 are used to illustrate the interactions
between TD and AR+D, respectively, with MD as determined by the effects
on the policy criteria. Case TD-1 (see case MD-11, Table II.2.A) has an
elevated TD spending level, sufficient to accelerate the arrival of stage
2 by one year, as well as a lower MD spending level, only $37.3 million.
This case represents an increase of more than 26 percent for TD, and with
the lower MD spending, the market is penetrated at a much slower rate.
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Although the private sector is highly involved in this market, the low
market response to this policy reflects the trade-off between TD and MD
spending.
Case TD-2 is a return to the base case MD spending level. The policy
criteria for case TD-2 show substantial improvement over TD-1, except for
the extent of private involvement in the market. Case TD-2 even shows
some improvement over the base case. This illustrates that increased TD
spending, if it is sufficient to accelerate the arrival of stage 2 by at
least one year, is effective in increasing market penetration. When
compared to the basecase, TD-2 represents an increase in B of 8 percent,
and a 6 percent increase in the total market penetration after eight
years, but a small decrease in the percent private installations.
Cases TD-2 through TD-6 reflect basecases with TD spending levels
varying between $354 million and $1 billion spent over the eight year
period of the model. Each of the differences of TD spending from one
case to the next was sufficient to change the year in which stage 2
arrives by one year. The appropriate correlation coefficients for Cases
TD-2 through TD-6 are given in Table II.4.C.
Table II.4.C: Technology Development Correlation Coefficients
Correlation coefficients of TD spending with:
Variable Correlation
Percent Private Installations -.0005
Total Installations .2459
B .2873
Gross System Cost .2405
Spending per Kwp installed .1427
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Clearly, TD spending that is sufficient to accelerate the arrival of
new production technology has a positive effect on the rate of market
penetration and on the total number of installations after eight years.
The effects on ultimate gross system cost, on the spending efficiency,
and on the percent of the total installations that are private, are
negative.
To understand the effects of AR+D spending, it is necessary to
compare cases with equal stage 2 arrival dates. Cases TD-5 and ARD-1
both have stage 2 arrival dates in year 5, but the arrival dates of stage
3 are 9 and 7, respectively, due to increased AR+D spending in case
ARD-1. The increased spending in case ARD-1 results in improvements in
almost all policy criteria. With an increase in AR+D spending of 32
percent, the market is penetrated at a 19 percent faster rate (B), an
eighth year market penetration that is almost 21 percent higher, a drop
in the spending per installed peak kilowatt of almost 11 percent, but a
decrease as well in the percent of private installations of almost 17
percent. Similar results are found when comparing cases TD-2 to ARD-2
and TD-6 to ARD-3. It may be concluded, therefore, that AR+D spending is
effective in improving 3 of the 4 policy criteria, generally at the
expense of increased government participation in the market.
Cases ARD-4 and ARD-5 further illustrate the trade-off involved in MD
spending with other policy options. As in TD-1, where reduced MD
spending reduced the effectiveness of TD spending in improving the policy
criteria, ARD-4 and ARD-5 illustrate that reduced MD spending also
reduces the effectiveness of AR+D spending. Interactions and the
relative effectivenesses of the policy options will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter III.
11.5 Exogenous Parameters
In PVI, there are 4 parameters that are exogenously defined that may
have substantial effects on the results of the model. They are exogenous
in that they are user-defined and they are not related to policy
options. Three of these parameters (expected lifetime of the PV system,
average PV system conversion efficiency, and warranty period) are
certainly related to PV technology, but no attempt was made in PV1 to
make these parameters functions of TD or AR+D spending, due to the
difficulty in describing the functional nature of these relationships.
The fourth such parameter, the average annual rate of increase in the
real price of conventionally generated electricity, is exogenous to PV
technology as well. It is primarily a function of the current cost of
fuels and capital used
examine the effects of
through EX-14 in Table
Table II.5.A:
in generating electricity. The cases used to
these parameters are summarized in cases EX-1
II.5.A.
Models Run to Test for Exogenous Parameters
Warranty,
Months B
12 .322
12 .322
12 .247
12 .297
12 .297
12 .297
12 1.770
12 1.071
12 .370
12 .331
12 .262
6 .277
24 .431
36 .450
Spend/ %
Kw ($000's)
p Priv.
8.10 29.1
8.09 29.1
10.55 8.2
8.77 23.1
8.77 23.1
8.77 23.1
1.54 88.3
2.34 80.7
7.09 38.0
7.90 30.8
9.93 13.3
9.37 17.9
6.41 46.8
5.91 48.9
Case
EX-1
EX-2
EX- 3
EX-4
EX-5
EX-6
EX-7
EX-8
EX-9
EX-10
EX- 11
EX-12
EX-13
EX-14
Life,
Years
30
40
10
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Rate
Rise,%
3.0
3.0
3.0
0.0
5.0
20.0
75.0
50.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
System
Effic.
.12
.12
.12
.12
.12
.12
.12
.12
.25
.18
.06
.12
.12
.12
Total Kwp
Installed
172.4
172.4
129.5
158.0
158.0
158.0
1128.5
687.6
199.0
177.1
138.2
147.0
233.9
244.3
Electricity Rate Rise
The rate at which the price of electricity rises over time appears to
have an enormous effect on the policy parameters. This rate rise is in
real terms, over and above the general inflation rate. On closer
examination, however, the price of conventionally generated electricity
can rise at an average rate of 20 percent per year, without any
noticeable effects on the policy parameters. Not until this rate of
price increase is above 20 percent, and probably close to 50 percent, do
the policy parameters show any response. The rate of increase of
electricity is difficult to project since it is highly sensitive to
international energy prices, capital and regulatory expenses, and
disparities between installed capacity and peak load demands. This rate
increase is therefore subject to international and domestic political
forces, as well as a utility's ability to plan for future expansion with
accuracy.
The other exogenous parameters, PV system life and efficiency, and
warranty period, are characteristics of PV that may be affected by policy
options (such as TD and AR+D spending) and by characteristics of PV that
are the result of the PV production industry's confidence in the systems
they sell as reflected in the warranty period.
PV System Life
A decrease in the usable life of a PV system will substantially
reduce the appeal of PV in the market, as in case EX-3, but an increase
above the base case level of 20 years, as in EX-1 and EX-2, does not
substantially improve the policy parameters. Increasing the usable life
of PV systems does not appear to be a productive endeavor once the twenty
year life has been attained.
PV System Efficiency
By increasing the system conversion efficiency to approximately the
theoretical maximum for PV (25%), as in EX-9, the rate at which the
market is penetrated is increased by more than 24 percent, the total Kwp
installed by almost 26 percent, the percent private by more than 64
percent (from 23 to 38%) and government spending per total installed Kwp
is reduced by 19 percent compared to the base case. More modest results
are achieved with a more realistic projection of future average system
efficiency of 18 percent, as in EX-10, but as in EX-9, all policy
criteria are improved with increasing system efficiency. As expected,
reducing the system efficiency below the base case level resulted in
increased spending per Kwp installed and reduced market penetration and
private involvement in the market, as in EX-11. Increased system
efficiency, and its effect on the PV user economics, seems highly
desirable, and should therefore have a high priority within the PV
production industry.
PV System Warranty
The system warranty period has effects on the policy criteria that
are similar to those of system lifetime. Doubling the warranty period
from 12 to 24 months as in EX-13 causes an increase in the rate of market
penetration by 45 percent, an increase in the total market penetration to
48 percent, an increase in the percent of the market that is private of
more than 86 percent, and a reduction in government spending per
installed Kwp by almost 30 percent, all compared to the base case. This
trend is continued in EX-12 and EX-14. An increase in the PV warranty
period may be the result of improved PV technology. This could be
accelerated by increasing TD and AR+D spending, although the relationship
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of these policy options with the warranty period is unclear. The
warranty period may also be increased by raising the price of PV to cover
the added expenses of the warranty to the manufacturer. This could
represent an alternative policy option, that is, a government price
subsidy for PV by direct payments to the manufacturers for the purpose of
increasing their warranty periods.
These relationships are further clarified in Table II.5.B. The
correlation coefficients in this table indicate the directions of the
relationships. Since different cases are used, the quantities are not
directly comparable.
Table II.5.B: Correlation Coefficients for Exogenous Parameters
Policy Option
% Private
Total Install
B
Spending per
Gross System
Cases EX-
SSystem Life
.8988
.9139
.9136
Kwp -.8960
Cost .8677
1-4
Rate Rise System Efficiency Warranty Period
.9497 .9962 .8320
.9792 1.0000 .9520
.9778 1.0000 .9521
-.9484 -.9959 -. 9397
-.9800 .9313 .9177
5-8 9-11 12-14
11.6 Summary
This section has been a discussion of individual cases, and
individual policy options. The correlation coefficients that are given
reflect only those cases that were run to test for specific policy
options or exogenous parameters, and only provide a preliminary guide to
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the direction of influence on the four policy criteria. No conclusions
regarding policy should be drawn from them alone.
The next section establishes a more comprehensive analysis that
compares the relative relationships of the policy options with the policy
criteria. Section II is therefore only background information, and
provides a foundation on which to construct the policy analysis of
Section III.
III. Policy Analysis
In the previous chapter, the individual components of PV policy were
analyzed with respect to their relationships with the four policy
criteria. The ability of each of the components to enhance the criteria
was discussed, but a comparison among the components was not. In this
chapter, a set of ordinary least squares regression equations using all
50 cases is developed for two purposes: first, to estimate the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the policy components in affecting the policy
criteria, and second, to act as a summary of the basecase model in terms
of a linear moael. This second purpose is meant to assist the policy
maker in preliminary assessments of proposed policies. In this sense,
the regression equations should be used only as a first approximation for
a policy analysis, and as such should not be taken as the final result.
These regressions could form a guideline, for example, for the
construction of a new basecase that interests the policy maker. In
general, this chapter is a discussion of policy trade-offs and policy
options coordination.
III.1 Introduction
Four regressions were run, one for each of the policy criteria. Each
equation includes independent variables relating to spending amounts and
the exogenous parameters. There are four regressions because it is left
to the policy maker to evaluate the relative importance of each of the
four policy criteria.
In addition to the variables listed in Table III.1.A, a variable C
has been created that is used as a dependent variable in the regression
equations in lieu of PCTPRIV, in order to prevent this dependent variable
from being less than zero or greater than 1.0:
PCTPRIV + .5
C (1.5 - PCTPRIV)
For this chapter, we define the following variables:
Table III.1.A
Variables Used in PV1 Policy Analysis
Policy spending variables
TD $ million spent after eight years for technology development
MD $ million spent after eight years for market development
ARD $ million spent after eight years for advanced research and
development
SUB $ million spent after eight years for subsidy
ADV $ million spent after eight years for advertising
Intermediate variables
GSC Gross system cost, after eight years, $/W
NSC Net system cost, after eight years, $/W P
RR Average annual rate of increase of the price of electricity
Policy criteria variables
TOTINST Total installea Kw of PV after eight years
SPGPKW Government spendin per total Kwp of PV installed after eight years
B The coefficient of t in the regression equation:
S= A + Bt
Where x(t) is the Kwp installed at time t, L(t) is the total market
at time t, in Kw
PCTPRIV Percent of the total installed Kw that is private (that is,
installations that are not the result of government market
development)
PV Characteristics
LIFE The expected useful life of PV, in years
WARR Warranty period, in months
PVEF Average system conversion efficiency, percent
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One main purpose of this report is to estimate the effects of policy
options on the policy criteria. This measures the effectiveness of
specific amounts of government dollars spent in specific areas, such as
market development and subsidy. Unfortunately, the effects of policies
relating to TD and AR+D cannot be determined directly, but rather in
terms of the arrival dates of Stages 2 and 3. Table III.1.B summarizes
these relationships.
Table III.1.B
Policy Variables
(1) (2)
A PRIORI RELATED VARIABLES NOT
DEFINABLE ABLE TO BE SPECIFIED BY
VARIABLES POLICY MAKERS
TD Spending Stage 2 arrival date (STG2)
AR+D Spending Stage 3 arrival date (STG 3)
To understand thoroughly and describe the meanings of various
spending levels, 2 subsets of regression equations were used. The first
usea only spending levels. The second equations used the variables from
column (2) in Table III.1.B, above (in lieu of TD and ARD), as well as MD
and other variables. The coefficients generated are useful in projecting
the outcomes for the policy criteria as functions of the policy options.
This results in the generation of 8 equations. One equation was
generated for each of the 2 subsets described above, and for each of the
four policy criteria.
To use these equations for understanding the relative strengths of
relationships between policy options and criteria, standardized
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regression coefficients (called betas) are also given. The value of each
beta coefficient is the change in the number of standard deviations of
the dependent variable from the mean that will be caused by a one
standard deviation change in each of the independent variables. If 'b'
is the regression coefficient, then beta is defined as:
S
beta= b(s )
where Sd and Si are the standard deviations of the dependent and
independent variables, respectively. With these 'normal equations', the
total number of regression equations is 16.
As a preliminary step to performing the regressions, correlation
coefficients using all of the cases were calculated. These are given in
Table III.1.C. From this table, it appears that the correlations with
'B' are similar to the correlations with the total Kwp installed. In
fact, these two variables are very highly correlated with each other,
with a value of .9978, although there is reason to suspect that they will
not always be highly correlated. In the regression equations there are
differences in the coefficients that are large enough to warrant the use
of both variables.
Table III.1.C
Correlation Coefficients Using All Cases
Total Kwp
Installed
Subsidy
MD
ADV
TD
AR+D
STG2
STG3
Life
Rate Rise
PV efficiency
Warranty Period
Net System Cost
Gross System Cost
.8732
.1815
.0669
-.0402
-.0311
.0317
.0231
.0012
.9489
.0188
.0671
-.0257
-.2976
Private
Installations
.8655
.2172
.0854
-.0306
-. 0224
.0208
.0131
.0061
.9322
.0268
.0836
-. 0531
-. 3224
Spending
per Kwp
Installed
-.4973
-.7178
-.7178
.3010
.1940
-.3024
-.1626
-.0828
-.4539
-.1120
-.1880
.2135
.2660
.7071
-. 4460
-. 4460
-.0412
-. 1243
.0333
.1416
.0743
.6575
.1233
.2384
.1708
.0764
-- ~-~
111.2 General Policy Considerations
This section is a discussion of the relative merits of the policy
options in terms of their abilities to effect improvements in the policy
criteria. This includes a discussion of the effects of the exogenous
parameters. All of the regression coefficients are listed in the
appendix to chapter III, Tables III.A.1 through III.A.8.
The relative strengths of the relationships of the policy option
spending levels and the exogenous parameters are reflected in the values
of Beta, the 2nd column of the tables, in Tables III.A.1 through
III.A.4. In these tables, net system cost is included as an independent
variable. It would have been preferable to use net system cost (NSC) as
an intermediate variable. In this form, NSC would have been the
dependent variable with the five policy options as independent
variables. In turn, NSC and the exogenous parameters would be
independent variables, and the policy criteria, dependent variables.
Unfortunately, only a small fraction of the variance of NSC could be
explained by the policy options, about 25 percent, so this form is not
used (see Table IV.1).
111.2.1 Spending per Kwp Installed (SPGPKW)
The spending per Kwp installed is a measure of the efficiency of a
policy. The lower the value of SPGPKW, the more efficient the policy;
therefore a negative coefficient indicates a contribution toward a more
efficient policy. Caution must be exercised in using this criterion in
cases that are run with extremely low government spending levels. In a
PV1 run such as this, any incidental market penetration will generate an
overly optimistic value for this criterion that could easily be
misleading. Therefore, the use of this policy criterion is only
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recommended for use in sensitivity-type analyses which avoid extremely
small government expenditure levels, such as the analysis that is
presented here.
Only two of the five policy options have negative coefficients for
this criterion (see Table III.A.1), MD and ARD. The coefficient for ARD
is negligible. However, the policy efficiency is, on a percentage basis,
more sensitive to changes in MD than to any one of the other policy
options, or, in fact, to any of the exogenous parameters. This means
that an increase in MD spending can easily offset efficiency losses from
spending in the other policy option areas, or from, for example, a real
decrease in the price of electricity over time. This also means that any
policy that includes expenditures for TD, SUB, or ADV should also include
some spending for MD, or the overall policy will tend to be inefficient.
There is one other idea that is illustrated here, and is repeated
consistently throughout this analysis, and that is that an increase in
the real price of electricity over time will improve every one of the
policy criterion, although to varying degrees.
111.2.2 Total Kwp Installed (TOTINST)
The most important coefficient in this normalized equation is the
average annual rise in the real price of electricity (see Table
III.A.2). A percentage increase in this figure will contribute more to
the total market penetration after eight years than any other factor
considered.
Among the policy options, the most important is SUB, followed by MD
and ARD. This and other results indicate the vital necessity of
coordination between MD and SUB spending. ARD is discussed in more
detail in Section 111.3.
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One surprising value is the coefficient for the varible NSC. This
Beta is .0451, which means that a high NSC will generate increased market
penetration. This implies that the acceleration of market penetration
should be attacked directly, with less emphasis on the reduction of net
system prices and that NSC should not be used as an indicator of the
degree of success or failure of a PV policy. This is counter-intuitive,
and contrasts markedly with current government policy emphasis.
111.2.3 Market Penetration Rate (B)
Many of the observations made concerning TOTINST are also true of B
(see Table III.A.3): the most important factor is the rate of the
increase of the real price of electricity; NSC is surprisingly
unimportant; and the same three policy options are the most important
(SUB, MD, and ARD), although in different order. On a percentage basis,
SUB will contribute slightly more to the speed of market penetration than
will MD. This also indicates the need to coordinate these two policy
options.
The relative results regarding the importance of NSC and SUB in the
equations with both B and TOTINST as dependent variables would be
spurious if NSC and SUB were highly correlated. This would mean that
only one of them (SUB or NSC) should be used as an independent variable,
and that the low Beta coefficient for NSC is misleading. It is true that
NSC and SUB have a relationship (with GSC as an intervening variable),
but fortunately the Pearson correlation for SUB and NSC is only -.215.
Other correlations also tend to substantiate the beta coefficients.
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Pearson Correlation Coefficients
B TOTINST NSC SUB
B 1.00 .998 -.053 .865
TOTINST .998 1.00 
-.026 .873
NSC -.053 -.026 1.00 -.215
SUB .865 .873 -.215 1.00
Therefore, the beta coefficients of NSC and SUB in the equations for B
and TOTINST are meaningful.
111.2.4 Percent Private Installations (C)
The variable "C" is a transformation of the actual fraction of the
market that is private:
C = ln(PCTPRIV + .5
1.5 - PCTPRIV
As expected, the value of the Beta coefficient for MD spending is
negative for this policy criterion; the more MD spending for government
installations, the lower the percent of the total installations that are
private. It was not expected, however, that the coefficient for NSC
would be positive. This means that the higher the net system cost, the
higher the percentage of private involvement in the market. This further
illustrates the inappropriateness of NSC as a policy criterion.
Fortunately, the coefficient for SUB is positive, and larger in value
than that for MD. The reduction in the percent of the market that is
private as a result of MD spending can therefore be more than offset by
SUB spending of an equal amount.
The importance of the average annual rise in the real price of
electricity is less important to this policy criterion than to the
others. Among the exogenous parameters, the most important here is the
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warranty perioa, although even this value is relatively small.
Later sections include more detailed discussions of the tradeoffs
between MD and SUB, the two policy options that appear to be the most
critical in terms of the policy criteria.
111.2.5 Summary
Among the policy options, the most important appear to be MD and
SUB. In the equations for two of the policy criteria ('C' and SPGPKW),
tnese two options have opposite signs. There is no clear pattern to
these sign changes; MD contributes to the positive aspect of SPGPKW in
that its sign is negative, but naturally reduces the percentage of
private involvement in the market. SUB also reverses signs and senses.
Both contribute positively to 'B' and TOTINST. Only in the equation for
SPGPKW is SUB less important than other policy options.
This further illustrates the need to coordinate the spending levels
for SUB and MD. One approach to this policy coordination is given in
section 111-3.
Among the exogenous parameters, the most important for all of the
policy criteria except 'C' is the average annual rate of the increase of
the price of electricity, and even in this criterion, RR is more
important than TD spending. Among the remaining exogenous parameters,
(those that may be controlled by policy makers and/or manufacturers), the
warranty period is the most important. This implies an alternative
policy focus, in lieu of an extension of the useful life for PV units or
their system conversion efficiency.
III-3 Optimal Policy Spending Levels
The formulation of an "optimal" policy must be the result of the
application of much subjective reasoning and judgment. We have noted
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that the signs of two of the policy options reverse between two of the
policy criteria. This means that increases in each of these options will
involve improvements in some criteria and sacrifices in others.
The method used here to deal with these tradeoffs is to set bounds on
the policy criteria. These limits are set here on the basis of the
experience from the 50 cases run during the analysis, which provided
guidance in terms of the range of feasibility of each of the criteria.
In order to simplify the analysis, and since is appears to have little
impact on the policy criteria, the level of ADV spending was set to the
basecase level of $126 million for the eight year period.
111.3.1 ARD and TD Spending Levels
Policy regarding the spending levels of ARD and TD should be
coordinated since they both relate to the reduction of module prices, and
because it would be pointless to overemphasize the importance of the
arrival of stage 3 production technology through increase ARD spending
without a corresponding emphasis on the arrival of stage 2 through
increased TD spending.
Two assumptions made the first estimation of optimal ARD and TD
spending levels an easier task: 1) given basecase spending levels for
other policy optons and basecase values for the exogenous parameters, the
rate that the market is penetrated should be at least .35 x 10-4 (or,
as used in Table III.A.7, 35,000; the decimal has been moved to
facilitate the computation of reasonable coefficients); and 2) the
combined effect of the arrival of stages 2 and 3 should be to contribute,
or at least not to detract from, the value of SPGPKW, as given in Table
III.A.5. (that is, the combined effect should be no greater than zero).
51
The first assumption leads to the inequality:
12.58 > .139 (Stage 3) + Stage 2
and the second assumption generates the approximate inequality:
Stage 2 < Stage 3 < 2(Stage 2)
where Stage 2 and Stage 3 refer to the number of years from the beginning
of the 8-year planning period to the arrivals of Stages 2 and 3,
respectively.
Allowing some flexibility in the first assumption, and seeking the
highest values for Stage 2 and Stage 3 (to minimize cost), there are two
combinations that will satisfy the constraints: Stage 3 = 7, Stage 2 =
4; and Stage 3 = 6, Stage 2 = 5. There appears to be little difference
between the two either in terms of spending levels or in abilities to
meet the constraints. Strictly as a matter of judgement, therefore, the
first of the two combinations was chosen. From the 50 cases run, it
appears that this requires spending levels of $410 million for ARD, and
$606 million for TD, over the eight year period.
These spending levels would appear to violate assumption (2) above,
with regard to Table III.A.1. In this table, the coefficients for TD and
ARD are 3.527 and -2.315. If the combined effects of these two policy
options are not to increase the value of SPGPKW, then ARD should be at
least 1.52 times TD. Unfortunately, this would bring the arrival of
stage 3 sooner than the arrival of stage 2, and could contribute
substantially to the decrease in the variable 'C', as shown in Table
III.A.4. If further constraints, with MD and SUB spending levels,
cannot be met, spending levels for ARD and TD will be reviewed.
111.3.2 SUB and MD Spending Levels
The spending levels for ADV, ARD and TD have been established in the
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previous sections. It should be noted that these spending levels should
be considered flexible, since the policy criteria appear to be less
sensitive to them than to SUB and MD spending levels. In addition, these
estimates are based on linear least-squares regression equations, which
are themselves subject to error (that is, their R2 values are all
less than 1.00).
Substituting the values for ADV, ARD, and TD that were calculated in
the previous section, and the basecase values for the exogenous
parameters, into the equations for 'C' (Table III.A.4), TOTINST (Table
III.A.2), and SPGPKW (Table III.A.1), and setting constraints on these
three variables, a solution space was derived from which the least cost
combination of spending levels was estimated. The values of SPGPKW and
TOTINST, judging from what is feasible and desirAble from the 50 cases
that were run initially, were constrained to being no more than 6,000 and
no less than 200,000, respectively. If the percent of private
involvement is to be at least 35 percent, then the value of 'C' should be
-0.30, or greater. Substituting and simplifying, the following three
inequalities are derived:
1.00 < .0019(MD) - .00012(SUB) (SPGPKW)
1.00 < .0017(MD) + .0036(SUB) (TOTINST)
1.00 > .0075(MD) - .012(SUB) ('C')
The solution space is indicated in Figure III.1. Within the solution
space, the point nearest the origin represents the point of least cost.
In Figure III.1, this is point 'A', where MD spending is $542 million,
and SUB is $255 million.
The total spending for this policy is therefore $1.94 billion, which
is substantially above the basecase level of $1.39 billion. The first
FIGURE III.1: Solution Space for MD and SUB Spending
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areas to trim could be ARD and TD, as stated above.
To allow the arrivals of Stages 2 and 3 to occur one year later
required a decrease in TD to $480 million and ARD to $310 million. In
addition, the spending per KWp was allowed to increase to 8000, and the
percent private involvement was relaxed to 30 percent (C = .405). With
the hope that the value of 'B' was still within an acceptable range, this
generated three new inequalities:
1.00 < .0014(MD) + .0029(SUB) (TOTINST)
1.00 < .0026(MD) + .00016(SUB) (SPGPKW)
1.00 > .0048(MD) + .0074(SUB) ('C')
This alternate set of inequalities is illustrated in Figure 111.2,
with the point corresponding to the least cost combination at 'A'. This
combination of policy options should result in a total spending level of
$1.47 billion over the eight year period.
III.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed the relative importance of each of
the policy options and the exogenous parameters in their effects on the
policy criteria and on total policy costs. We have compared two policy
option combinations to illustrate trade-offs among the policy options and
total government spending, particularly with regard to MD and SUB
spending. It has been shown that, as a preliminary estimate, a small
decrease in MD spending and a substantial increase in SUB spending,
compared to the basecase, can provide a marked improvement in the policy
criteria with only a modest increase in total spending.
It was found that policy criteria could be estimated on the bases of
policy options, and an "optimal" level could be estimated as well:
FIGURE 111.2: Alternate Solution Space for MD and SUB Spending
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Thus, by increasing the total spending by only 5.7 percent, the estimated
values of TOTINST increased by 25 percent, 'B' increased by almost 23
percent, the percent private involvement, by nearly 53 percent, and the
value of SPGKW, the total amount spent by the government per total
installed KWp of PV, decreased by more than 7 percent. By spending more
for subsidy and less for market development, all of the policy criteria
were projected to be enhanced.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III
(For definitions of variables, see Table III.I.A)
Table III.A.1
Dependent Variable: SPGPKW
MEAN: 9125 STANDARD DEVIATION: 3200
Independent Variable
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
MD
NSC
TD
ADV
ARD
SUB
Constant
R2 = .8189
Nunber of Cases: 50
b
-86.33
-125.78
-186.16
-170.68
-26.17
13.71
3.527
4.935
-2.315
1.633
22975.34
Beta
-.0938
-. 4808
-. 1254
-. 2070
-.7007
.2441
.1215
.0738
-. 0617
.0333
Mean
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
425.4
175.0
511.9
127.6
336.0
53.9
Standard
Deviation
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
85.7
57.0
110.2
47.8
85.3
65.3
Table III.A.2
Dependent Variable: TOTINST
MEAN: 192263 STANDARD DEVIATION: 158500
Independent Variable Beta Mean
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
MD
SUB
ARD
TD
NSC
ADV
Constant
R2 = .9599
933.40
9092.26
2264.02
2427.55
353.14
725.86
207.23
80.76
125.44
26.782
-262,676.8
Number of Cases:
Standard
Devi ati on
.0205
.7016
.0315
.0594
.1909
.2992
.1115
.0562
.0451
.0081
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
425.4
53.9
336.0
511.9
175.0
127.6
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
85.7
65.3
85.3
110.2
57.0
47.8
Table III.A.3
Dependent Variable: B
Independent Variable
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
MD
NSC
TD
SUB
ARD
ADV
Constant
2
R = .9518
Number of Cases:
b
185.28
1383.67
453.67
493.74
65.48
8.007
16.203
106.80
31.90
4.268
-43,235.70
Beta
.0265
.6974
.0412
.0790
.2311
.0188
.0736
.2875
.1121
.0084
Mean
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
425.4
175.0
511.9
53.9
336.0
127.6
Standard
Deviation
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
85.7
57.0
110.2
65.3
85.3
47.8
Table III.A.4
Dependent Variable: C
MEAN: -0.4339 STANDARD DEVIATION: 0.3524
Independent Variable
SUB
MD
ADV
TD
ARD
NSC
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
Constant
R2 = .8750
Number of Cases: 50
b
.0034
-. 0022
.00004
.00004
-. 00046
.0013
.0086
.0036
.0183
.0152
-. 4203
Beta
.6365
-. 5241
.0055
.0137
-. 1122
.2174
.0849
.1251
.1143
.1670
Mean
53.9
425.4
127.6
511.9
336.0
175.0
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
Standard
Deviation
65.3
85.7
47.8
110.2
85.3
57.0
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
Table III.A.5
Dependent Variable: SPGPKW
MEAN: 9125 STANDARD DEVIATION: 3200
Independent Variable
LIFE
RR
PV EF
WARR
MD
NSC
STG2
STG3
ARV
Constant
R2 = .8187
Number of Cases: 50
b
-86.295
-118.830
-180.873
-167.567
-26.069
12.740
-474.612
286.846
4.7757
23917.23
Beta
-. 0938
-. 4543
-. 1245
-.2033
-. 6980
.2269
-. 1359
.0952
.0714
Mean
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
425.4
175.0
4.8
8.7
127.6
Standard
Deviation
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
85.7
57.0
0.9
1.1
47.8
F-level or Tolerance-level insufficient to include SUB
Table III.A.6
Dependent Variable: TOTINST
MEAN: 192263 STANDARD DEVIATION: 158500
Independent Variable
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
MD
SUB
STG3
NSC
STG2
ADV
Constant
R2 = .9614
Number of Cases: 50
b
899.53
8897.83
2174.83
2305.32
353.25
767.53
18942.4
164.96
-8306.16
27.393
47012.75
Beta
.0197
.6866
.0302
.0565
.1909
.3163
.1269
.0593
-. 0480
.0083
Mean
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
425.4
53.9
8.7
175.0
4.8
127.6
Standard
Deviation
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
85.7
65.3
1.1
57.0
0.9
47.8
Table III.A.7
Dependent Variable: B
MEAN: 34787 STANDARD DEVIATION: 24269
Independent Variable
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
MD
STG3
SUB
STG2
NSC
ADV
Constant
2
R = .9b33
Number of Cases: 50
b
179.84
1358.00
440.41
476.67
65.700
-2711.88
112.17
1944.92
13.228
4.2323
7827.986
Beta
.0258
.6844
.0400
.0762
.2322
-. 1186
.3019
-.0734
.0311
.0083
Mean
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
425.4
8.7
53.9
4.8
175.0
127.6
Standard
Deviation
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
85.7
1.1
65.3
0.9
57.0
47.8
Table III.A.8
Dependent Variable: C
MEAN: 0.4339 STANDARD DEVIATION: 0.3524
Independent Variable
SUB
MD
ADV
STG2
STG3
NSC
LIFE
RR
PVEF
WARR
Constant
R2 = .8729
Number of Cases: 50
b
.0035
-. 0021
.00004
.0045
.0257
.0014
.0085
.0033
.0181
.0150
-. 8148
Beta
.6486
-. 5182
.0053
.0118
.0774
.2272
.0843
.1144
.1134
.1647
Mean
53.9
425.4
127.6
4.8
8.7
175.0
20.4
5.7
12.3
12.6
Standard
Deviation
65.3
85.7
47.8
0.9
1.1
57.0
3.5
12.2
2.2
3.9
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IV. Summary and Policy Recommendations
It is not the purpose of this work to establish exact levels of
optimal spending. Instead, it is meant to provide general guidelines for
policy focus, for general relationships between government spending and
the resulting PV commercialization levels, and for trade-offs among the
spending alternatives. There are five such alternatives incorporated
into PV1: advertising, technology development, advaned research and
development, subsidy, and market development. The ability of these
spending options to accelerate the commercialization of PV are easured
using four criteria: the total KWp of PV installed after 8 years, the
rate at which the market has been penetrated over this 8-year period, the
percent of the total installed KWp that results from private sales
(using a logarithmic transformation), and the total government
expenditures per total KWp installed.
In comparing the effectiveness of these policy options, the beta
values from Tables III.A.1 to III.A.8 are used. it is important to note
that these betas, the standardized regression coefficients, reflect the
changes about the means in terms of numbers of standard deviations, and
that these values are only valid for the 50 cases that are in the
vicinity of the base case. A choice of another base case could easily
result in different betas.
Advertising
The algorithm used in PV1 for the effects of advertising on the
awareness of PV among potential buyers causes very weak relationships
between advertising and the four policy criteria. None of the beta
values for ADV are greater than .0738 in any of the multiple regressions
(Tables III.A.1-8). According to the assumptions in PV1, the entire task
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of increasing the awareness of PV could be undertaken by market
development, reducing ADV to zero, and the total market penetration after
8 years would be reduced by less than 1 percent.
Technology Development and Advanced Market Research and Development
The assumptions made in PV1 regarding these 2 spending options are
that: 1) TD spending will reduce the time required by industry that is
needed to produce PV modules using the most efficiently sized
manufacturing facilities (the arrival of stage 2); and 2) ARD spending
will reduce the time for the development of the PV module that will
represent the ultimate in terms of both technology and low price (the
arrival of stage 3).
It is possible that the production and basic technologies for PV
modules may occur in more (or less) than 3 stages. It is difficult to
determine the effectiveness of these policy options on price reductions.
It is indeed difficult to measure the benefits of TD and ARD spending in
any area. It may be the most appropriate strategy for the funding agency
to interact frequently with those organizations receiving funds for TD
and ARD, to adjust future spending levels.
While these recommendations are beyond the scope of PV1, the results
of this analysis indicate that neither policy option (TD nor ARD) has a
large effect on the policy criteria. The larges beta value has a
magnitude of only .1214 (Table III.A.1). The arrival dates of the new
production technologies (Stages 2 and 3) also have small effects on the
criteria. However, these spending options will have large impacts on the
gross system costs for PV, and although the GSC does not strongly affect
the early market penetration of PV, it could have a substantial impact on
this penetration in later years, once it has become a widely accepted
technology.
There are othger possible effects of TD and ARD spending: the
improvements in PV system life and efficiency. However, the cause and
effect relationships are unclear, and the beta coefficients for LIFE and
LVEF have low magnitudes.
Market Development and Subsidy
These two policy options are the most important of the five, with
magnitudes of their beta coefficients as high as .7007 for MD and .6365
for SUB. Increased expenditures for MD and SUB do not always contribute,
in a desirable direction, to the policy criteria. Their beta
coefficients are summarized in Figures IV-1 and IV-2.
From these two figures, it can be seen that an increase in SUB
spending will improve C, B, and TOTINST, with a relatively small
sacrifice in SPGPKW; an increase in MD will improve SPGPKW, B, and
TOTINST, but at a substantial sacrifice in C. Both SUB and MD could be
increased in equal amounts but that would result in a higher overall
budget. If SUB is increased substantially, however, a modest reduction
in MD will offset the increase in SPGPKW and return the other policy
criteria to levels at or above their previous levels. The spending
levels recommended in Chapter III, for example, represent a value for SUB
that is 1-1/2 standard deviations above its mean, and MD 1/3 below its
mean. These result in values for policy criteria that are better than
the mean values (except for C) and better than the base case values (for
all criteria).
Subsidy rates substantially highr than those currently in use by DOE
were shown to be very effective in accelerating commercialization,
especially if ceilings were removed. It is, however, advantageous to
FIGURE IV-1: SENSITIVITY OF POLICY CRITERIA TO SUBSIDY SPENDING
AS STANDARD DEVIATIONS FROM MEANS
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SPGPKW
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* from BETA Coefficients in Multiple Regression Equations that include
LIFE, RR, PVEF, WARR, NSC, and all 5 Policy Options (Tables III.A.1-4)
FIGURE IV-2: SENSITIVITY OF POLICY CRITERIA TO MARKET DEVELOPMENT
SPENDING AS STANDARD DEVIATIONS FROM MEANS*
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postpone these higher subsidies until the PV gross system cost has
declined sharply. The best subsidy timing appeared to be one in which
the subsidy rate increased steadily over time to a maximum level, and
remained there (as in case SUB-5, Table II.A.1).
One of the limitations of PV1 is illustrated here: there is no
provision in PV1 for the anticipation of PV price reductions that are
predictable. If it is government policy to increase subsidy over time,
many potential buyers may postpone their decision to purchase PV until
the maximum subsidy is offered.
Similar to SUB, it appears beneficial to postpone MD spending, since
this spending will purchase more PV when the price is lower, in later
years. A carefully managed program to install MD PV units in the most
advantageous regions of the country does not seem to be a worthwhile
endeavor.
(Another limitation of PV1 is apparent here. While the positive
effects of successful MD units are amply documented, there is no
provision for the negative effects of failures.)
A policy that waits lower net system costs (NSC) before making MD and
SUB expenditures represents a possible paradox: without MD and SUB
expenditures, NSC may decline very slowly. The results of these 50 cases
indicate that this paradox is only partly true. A multiple regression
equation was constructed using NSC as the dependent variable, and the
policy options as independent variables (See Table IV.1.).
The four policy options that can be included in this equation explain
only 25 percent of the variance of the NSC at the end of the 8-Oyear
model. The large magnitude of beta for ARD is the result of the
changeover to Stage 3 just before the 8th year of the model due to ARD
Table IV.1
Dependent Variable: NSC
MEAN: 175.0 STANDARD DEVIATION: 57.0
Independent Variable*
ARD
SUB
MD
TD
b
-. 3419
-. 2372
-. 1250
.0247
Beta
-. 5117
-. 2720
-. 1880
.0478
Mean
336.0
53.9
425.4
511.9
Constant: 343.26
R2 = .2513
Number of Cases: 50
F-level or Tolerance-level insufficient to include SUB
Standard
Deviation
85.3
65.3
85.7
110.2
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spending; ARD will not affect NSC values in earlier years. The low
magnitudes of the betas for MD and SUB indicate that these policy options
have little effect on NSC in the 8th year, and in earlier years as well.
There may be interactions, however, between MD and SUB that could
affect NSC in early years. Therefore, it is recommended that both MD and
SUB begin in early years at a low level, but above zero, and slowly build
over time to a maximum level. The maximum subsidy rate could be as high
as 80 percent, should have no ceiling associated with it, and could be
the same for all sectors.
Other Policy Options
Two of the exogenous parameters have high beta valus: RR (the real
annual rate of increase in the price of electricity) and WARR (the PV
warranty period). While it would be inappropriate to suggest that
capacity rates should be raised intentionally simply to accelerate the
commercialization of PV, it is apparent that the real price of
electricity has a powerful impact on the policy criteria. However, this
impact occurs only when the real price of electricity increases by at
least 20 percent per year over the 8-year period of the model.
Extending the warranty period seems to be a more realistic
alternative policy option. The increased cost to the manufacturer of an
extended warranty period could be directly subsidized by the government.
This would increase the acceptance of PV among potential buyers, and
thereby accelerate the commercialization of PV. As indicated in Secton
II.5, an extended warranty period would enhance all of the policy
criteria substantially. The cost of such a policy is unclear at this
time.
One counterintuitive conclusion of this analysis is that the
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reduction of net system costs should not be a primary policy goal. A
reduced NSC in the eighth year of the model will actually reduce the
private involvement in the market (Table III.A.4) and reduce the total
market penetration and its rate (Tables III.A.2 and 3), although a
reduced NSC will increase the overall policy efficiency (Table III.A.1).
Conclusion
PV1 has been used in the writing of this report to demonstrate its
use as a policy analysis device. The results, as summarized in this
chapter, indicate that PV1 could be used to determine the interactions
among policy options and to obtain guidelines for the relative levels of
spending in each of these options. It would be inappropriate to use PV
exclusively to arrive at absolute spending levels for any of the policy
options.
The conclusions arrived at in this paper reflect conditions at or
near the base case, as defined in Section 1.4. It is entirely possible
that different conclusions may be drawn given a substantially different
base case. If the policy maker feels that this base case is
inappropriate, a new one should be constructed, and this paper would then
serve as a guide to an extensive analysis using this new base case.
Further work is needed using PV1 to more clearly establish the
relationships among subsidy spending, market development spending, and
the next system cost during the intermediate years of the model. This
could help to define the increases and decreases of these options over
time, that would most efficiently accelerate the commercialization of
PV. Other work is needed to establish threshold spending amounts in each
of the policy options, in order to establish optimal spending levels in
absolute terms.
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